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When nonviolent activists design an action that poses a dilemma for opponents—for 
example whether to allow protesters to achieve their objective or to use force against 
them with consequent bad publicity—this is called a dilemma action. These sorts of 
actions have been discussed among activists and in activist writings but not 
systematically analyzed. We present a preliminary classification of different aspects of 
dilemma actions and apply it to three case studies: the 1930 salt march in India, a jail-in 
used in the Norwegian total resistance movement in the 1980s, and the freedom flotillas 
to Gaza in 2010 and 2011. In addition to defining what is the core of a dilemma action, 
we identify five factors that can make the dilemma more difficult for opponents to 
“solve.” Dilemma actions derive some of their effectiveness from careful planning and 





In 1967, during the Indochinese war, a US Quaker activist group organized a ship to 
deliver medical supplies to North Vietnam. The US government was placed in a 
dilemma: either allow the ship to deliver goods to its then enemy or use force to stop it, 
causing adverse publicity from stopping humanitarian action. 
 US nonviolent activist George Lakey used this example in his book Powerful 
Peacemaking to illustrate what he called “dilemma demonstrations.”1 He presented the 
dilemma as between two options for authorities: either let protesters continue with their 
demonstration, which would achieve an immediate goal, including educating the public, 
or use force to stop them, thereby revealing their harsh side and generating popular 
concern.  
 Dilemma actions have been discussed within activist circles, with occasional 
commentary in print. For example, the manual Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points, 
written by Otpor activists involved in the struggle that brought down Slobodan 
Milosevic’s government in Serbia in 2000, includes a two-page treatment of dilemma 
                                                
1 George Lakey, Powerful Peacemaking: A Strategy for a Living Revolution 
(Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1987 [1973]). 
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actions.2 Their formulation is slightly different from Lakey’s. They recommend 
identifying a government policy that conflicts with widely held beliefs and then 
designing an action that requires the government to choose either doing nothing or 
applying sanctions that violate the widely held beliefs. For example, the policy might be 
censorship, the widely held belief be that people should have access to information and 
the action be publishing Buddhist literature. “In either case the government loses, 
because doing nothing means allowing its policies and laws to be disobeyed, and 
reacting with sanctions means violating what most of the population feels are important 
beliefs and values.”3 The idea of appealing to widely held beliefs is not unique to Otpor: 
it was also emphasized by Bill Moyer in his writings about how social movements 
should strategize to win.4 
 Philippe Duhamel gives this description: 
 
A dilemma demonstration is a tactical framework that puts power holders in a 
dilemma: if the action is allowed to go forward, it accomplishes something 
worthwhile related to the issue or position being asserted. If the power holders 
repress the action, they put themselves in a bad light, and the public is educated 
about the issue or position.5  
 
Duhamel provides a comprehensive analysis of a dilemma action in 2001 in Ottawa, 
Canada, that was part of a citizens’ campaign against the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas.  
 Dilemma actions are worthy of interest for both activists and academics. For 
activists, they provide an approach for increasing the effectiveness of nonviolent-action 
strategies. Knowing more about the dynamics of dilemma actions and their core features 
can enable activists to design their actions to pose difficult dilemmas to opponents, 
                                                
2 Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milovojevic, and Slobodan Djinovic, Nonviolent 
Struggle: 50 Crucial Points, 2d ed. (Belgrade: Center for Applied Non Violent Action 
and Strategies, 2007), 70–71.  
3 Ibid., 71. 
4 Bill Moyer, with JoAnn McAllister, Mary Lou Finley, and Steven Soifer, 
Doing Democracy: The MAP Model for Organizing Social Movements (Gabriola Island, 
BC, Canada: New Society Publishers, 2001). 
5 Philippe Duhamel, The Dilemma Demonstration: Using Nonviolent Civil 
Disobedience to Put the Government between a Rock and a Hard Place (Minneapolis, 
MN: Center for Victims of Torture, 2004), 6.  
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leading opponents to make inferior decisions or waste their efforts preparing for several 
possible responses. Below we will show that activists and scholars have sometimes 
talked about an important element of a particular dilemma action as if it was a core 
feature of the phenomenon of dilemma actions. In our analysis we list five factors that 
can make a dilemma more acute but are not core features of dilemma actions generally. 
Being aware that elements can be important without being central ought to make it 
easier for activists to conceptualize a wider variety of dilemma actions. At the same 
time, understanding the range of elements that can contribute to a dilemma can inspire 
activists. Nonviolence scholars ought to pay attention to themes and concepts that 
activists discuss and care about; that dilemma actions have not been more carefully 
analyzed before is a major gap in nonviolence theory. In addition, understanding 
dilemma actions within nonviolent-action arenas has the potential to give peace 
researchers insights into dealing with or posing dilemmas in other domains, such as 
negotiations, peace-building, or ways to challenge structural violence.  
 Many dilemma actions derive their potency from the possibility that force used 
against nonviolent protesters may generate a backlash. The dynamics of this backlash 
were first conceptualized by Richard Gregg, based on his observations of campaigns led 
by Gandhi in India.6 Gregg coined the expression “moral jiu-jitsu”: violence by the 
authorities rebounds against them like the force of an opponent in the sport of jiu-jitsu. 
Gregg attributed moral jiu-jitsu to psychological effects on attackers, though Weber 
later showed that the effect was due to influences on third parties, not on the police who 
beat protesters.7 Nonviolence scholar Gene Sharp generalized Gregg’s concept to 
include social and political processes for generating a backlash when authorities use 
force against peaceful protesters, calling this “political jiu-jitsu.” Sharp used examples 
such as the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in 1960 and the bloody Sunday 
killings in Russia in 1905.8 Brian Martin has developed the backfire model, a 
generalization of Sharp’s political jiu-jitsu that includes methods used by attackers to 
reduce outrage from their actions and counter-methods by which protesters can increase 
                                                
6 Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence, 2d rev. ed. (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1966 [1934]).  
7 Thomas Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Walked Forward until Struck Down’: 
Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion,” Peace & Change, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993): 267–
289. 




outrage.9 In all these frameworks, a jiu-jitsu or backfire effect is less likely when 
protesters use violence, because more observers will judge that violence by the 
authorities is legitimate.  
 A question then arises: is every nonviolent action a dilemma action? After all, 
authorities always have a choice between allowing the action to proceed and using force 
to stop it. Nonviolent action does not pose a dilemma to authorities in at least two 
circumstances. The first is when the action can be ignored or tolerated because it has 
little credibility, only a small audience or is considered harmless. The second is when 
countermeasures such as repression do not generate popular concern. This can happen 
when authorities inhibit outrage, for example by operating in secret. 
 A dilemma action is therefore a special kind of action in which the choices for 
the opponent are not easy, as assessed at the time or in hindsight. A conventional 
expression of social concern, such as an antiwar rally on Hiroshima Day in a liberal 
democracy, poses no dilemma: authorities may tolerate or even facilitate the event 
because it poses little threat to vested interests, whereas banning it would arouse 
antagonism. Some forms of civil disobedience, such as ploughshares actions involving 
damaging military equipment, also pose no dilemma, because authorities know exactly 
what to do: arrest the activists, who willingly surrender to police. Nevertheless, it is 
more useful to think of dilemma actions as a matter of degree rather than dichotomously 
present or absent. In the ideal type of a dilemma action, the optimal choice for the 
opponent is not obvious to anyone. 
 The concept of dilemma, namely a difficult choice between options, each of 
which has advantages and disadvantages, is generic. However, there appears not to be 
any standard classification of types of dilemmas. In philosophy, there is discussion of 
moral dilemmas, which, while of limited direct applicability to dilemma actions, raises 
some relevant concepts.10 Many nonviolent activists are motivated by moral 
considerations, so it is useful to survey what philosophers say about moral dilemmas. 
 The moral dilemmas most commonly analyzed are faced by individuals, who 
must make a choice within a single moral framework. Philosophers disagree about 
                                                
9 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield , 2007). 
10 Christopher W. Gowans, Moral Dilemmas (New York: Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); H. E. Mason, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory (New York: 




whether moral systems should allow dilemmas, or whether every set of choices has a 
unique correct answer. However, these matters are irrelevant for the practicalities of 
most dilemmas involving nonviolent action, because they are multi-person interactions, 
and the different participants may be, and often are, operating with different moral 
frameworks. Nevertheless it is worth exploring what philosophers say about dilemmas, 
in order to see whether there are any insights relevant to understanding dilemma 
actions. 
 Philosophers have analyzed moral dilemmas imposed by others where an 
individual has to decide what to do, a famous example being Sophie’s Choice, in which 
Nazis tell a mother to choose which one of her two children will live; if she refuses to 
choose, both will be killed.11 However, the perspective of those constructing dilemmas 
to be imposed on others is lacking from the literature. This also brings up another point 
of difference. Philosophers have analyzed dilemmas imposed by “bad guys” such as 
Nazis. Nonviolent activists, in opposing repression and injustice, might be seen as the 
“good guys,” at least by many outside observers, a configuration not addressed in 
studies of moral dilemmas. 
 James Jasper, a sociologist and social movement researcher, offers another 
approach to dilemmas. Using the concept of games (but being critical of game theory), 
he emphasizes the complexities of problems people face in everyday life, and the 
importance of the interactions and relationships between everyone involved in the 
dilemma, rather than seeking solutions to the problems.12 Like philosophers, Jasper 
distinguishes dilemmas involving individuals (single players) from those involving 
“compound players” such as organizations. Another term used by Jasper is the “arena” 
where a dilemma takes place. The concepts of single player, compound player and arena 
are useful for studying dilemma actions, as is Jasper’s emphasis on the question of who 
initiates the engagement.  
 Jasper lists a wide range of dilemmas, such as whether to think about immediate 
objectives or long-term goals13 or whether to treat followers as resources or as players.14 
However, he does not address the question of trying to impose dilemmas on others. 
                                                
11 William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (London: Vintage, 2000, 1979). 
12 James M. Jasper, Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in the Real World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
13 Ibid., 83. 
14 Ibid., 92. 
 
7 
 Game theory provides another approach to dilemmas. The most well-known 
configuration is the prisoner’s dilemma, which is an interactive scenario: a prisoner’s 
payoff depends on the choice made by the other prisoner as well the prisoner’s own 
choice. The configuration of a dilemma action is different, in that activists intend their 
opponent to experience a dilemma, though sometimes activists face dilemmas too. In 
game theory, dilemma actions can be accommodated by having payoffs in two different 
domains that cannot be combined quantitatively. However, not allowing quantitative 
combination negates most of the mathematical apparatus of game theory. 
 To illustrate the potential complexity of dilemmas, it is useful to divide them 
into types. We propose a framework with three domains and multiple types within each 
domain. 
 




Domain of relationships 
Interpersonal dilemmas (involving, for example, friendship) 
Intra-organizational dilemmas (involving relationships between groups within 
organizations) 
Inter-organizational dilemmas (involving relationships between different organizations) 
 





A solely moral dilemma could involve a choice between two moral principles, for 
example between protecting a child and protecting the mother (as in a dangerous birth). 
An inter-organizational dilemma might involve whether to placate one of two rival 
groups in a coalition when this is highly likely to antagonize the other group. 
 Then there are mixed dilemmas involving combinations of different types of 
dilemmas, especially between different domains. A moral-interpersonal dilemma could 
involve a choice between a moral principle and a friend, for example whether to support 
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a friend for a position over someone who is better qualified. An ideological-economic 
dilemma might involve a choice between a belief system and economic interests, for 
example whether to support subsidies for an industry that clash with a belief in free 
markets.  
 In game theory formalism, a dilemma can be presented as in Table 1, which 
illustrates a political dilemma for the US government. Allowing the ship to deliver 
goods to North Vietnam is a political loss of magnitude a, but there are no adverse 
consequences from using force (-a, 0); using force to stop the ship means no political 
consequences from a delivery, but there is a political loss of magnitude b from adverse 
publicity (0, -b). 
 
Table 1 A political dilemma for the US government 
Allow the ship to deliver goods (-a, 0) US government 
Use force to stop the ship (0, -b) 
 
The dilemma arises because there is no simple or commonly agreed way of 
amalgamating the two types of payoffs to a single measure. Sometimes the dilemma is 
posed to a single opponent, for example a political leader, who is torn between ordering 
the use of force or not; in many cases, the dilemma is posed to a compound player, such 
as a committee in which different individuals have different preferences. Often, there 
are both short term and long term aspects of the dilemma to be taken into consideration 
for all sides. 
 With this background, we can lay out the features of a dilemma action. First, the 
other side must have choices. Second, the outcomes of different choices have mixtures 
of benefits and costs that are qualitatively different or in different domains. No choice 
by the opponent can be obviously better by all criteria or according to all decision-
makers. 
 Uncertainty is probably involved in most cases. No one knows for sure exactly 
what will happen following a choice of action, or perhaps there are disagreements about 
what will happen. However, strategy is about making decisions under uncertainty, 
taking into account the relative likelihood of different outcomes. Uncertainty does not 
mean absence of knowledge: there can be knowledge about what things are more likely 
to occur, and nonviolent activists planning a dilemma action are likely to benefit from 
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thinking along these lines. First, they could consider possible opponent responses and 
assess the likely effects of those responses. Then they could choose a different action, 
modify their chosen action or make preparations to increase the benefits to the activists 
if the opponents make their best response. If opponents make a second-best choice, the 
benefits to the activists are even greater. 
 Taking Jasper’s concepts of players, arenas and initiatives as well as the 
theoretical background of domains as our starting point, we developed a set of questions 
to apply to potential case studies of dilemma actions. The intention with these questions 
is to be able to compare the case studies and find elements that contribute to the 
dilemma without being core features. 
 
Who are the players?  
Who initiates the engagement? 
Which arenas are available?  
Which arena do the activists try to play on? 
What types of dilemmas are involved? 
What choices does the opponent have in the short and long run?  
What are the consequences of the action in the short and long run?  
How does the dilemma action differ from other possible actions? Specifically, 
how does the choice or design of the dilemma action affect the 
attractiveness of the opponent’s responses? 
 
In the following sections, we examine three nonviolent actions with characteristics of a 
dilemma action: the 1930 salt march in India, a humorous intervention in the Norwegian 
total resistance campaign in the 1980s, and the 2010 and 2011 freedom flotillas to Gaza. 
In selecting these cases out of many possible ones, we aimed for diversity in terms of 
time, place, numbers involved and context. The three case studies, spanning more than 
80 years, include an anti-colonial struggle, a national case in a democratic setting, and 
an international solidarity action. We also picked cases that illustrate that what might 
seem to be a core feature in a particular case (for instance the constructive element in 
the Freedom Flotilla or the surprise element in the jail-in) turns out to be absent in other 
cases, meaning that it cannot be a core feature of all dilemma actions. Each action was 
one episode in a longer-running campaign. We describe the action and attempt to 
answer the questions above. Afterwards we identify the characteristics of dilemma 
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actions, and in the conclusion we spell out the implications for understanding dilemma 
actions and their relevance in nonviolence campaigns. 
 
THE SALT MARCH 
 
In 1930, the Indian independence movement faced many challenges. Gandhi was the 
acknowledged leader, but there were critics on the left and, more importantly, the 
population was splintered by caste, class, religion and sex, so it was difficult to find a 
way to unite Indians against the British colonial rulers. 
 Gandhi came up with the idea of a campaign against British salt laws. The salt 
tax was a minor matter in the scheme of British rule, but Gandhi realized it had the 
potential of mobilizing Indians from all walks of life.  The plan was to march to the sea 
with the intention of undertaking civil disobedience by making salt from seawater. The 
march was an elaborate affair, designed to maximize popular support through a slow 
build-up. Starting in March, the marchers took 24 days to reach the Dandi on the coast. 
Stopping at towns along the way, Gandhi gave talks and the marchers gained more 
support and publicity.15 
 The British rulers were faced by a dilemma: arrest Gandhi and other movement 
leaders as the march proceeded, or wait until they had broken the law. Arresting Gandhi 
early in the march had the advantage of restricting the mobilization of support the 
march was engendering; waiting until later meant the campaign achieved many of its 
goals. However, arresting Gandhi early could be counterproductive, because it 
contravened the rule of law: Gandhi, merely by walking and talking, did nothing illegal. 
British rule maintained much of its legitimacy, in India and Britain, from its adherence 
to its own norms. Because Gandhi was so famous, illegitimate action against him would 
inflame public opinion far beyond arresting a lesser figure. Furthermore, the issue of the 
salt laws seemed trivial at one level—therefore making arrests over violating the laws 
seem excessive—and, at another level, a powerful basis for mobilization, because it was 
so easy to understand the issues and participate in civil disobedience.  
 The salt march thus was a dilemma action, though this concept did not exist at 
the time. A nationalist newspaper clearly expressed the dilemma: 
 
                                                
15 Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The Historiography of Gandhi’s March 
to Dandi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997). 
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To arrest Gandhi is to set fire to the whole of India. Not to arrest him is to allow 
him to set the prairie on fire. To arrest Gandhi is to court a war. Not to arrest him 
is to confess defeat before the war is begun … In either case, Government stands 
to lose, and Gandhi stands to gain. … That is because Gandhi’s cause is righteous 
and the Government’s is not.16  
 
A history of the independence struggle describes the situation this way: 
 
The Government was placed in a classic “damned if you do, damned if you 
don’t” fix, i.e., if it did not suppress a movement that brazenly defied its laws, its 
administrative authority would be seen to be undermined and its control would 
be shown to be weak, and if it did suppress it, it would be seen as a brutal, anti-
people administration that used violence on non-violent agitators.17  
 
J. C. Kumarappa expressed the problem facing the British: 
 
Dharasana raid was decided upon not to get salt, which was only the means. Our 
expectations was that the Government would open fire on unarmed crowds . … 
Our primary object was to show the world at large the fangs and claws of the 
Government in all its ugliness and ferocity. In this we have succeeded beyond 
measure.18  
 
How to respond to the salt march was experienced as a moral dilemma by the viceroy, 
Lord Edward Irwin. In letters written at the time, he expressed his difficulty in deciding 
whether to arrest Gandhi.19  
 John Court Curry, a British police officer, encountered Gandhi in both 1919 and 
1930. So great was the tension he experienced in responding to nonviolent action that he 
felt “severe physical nausea.” 
 
                                                
16 Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 112. 
17 Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947 (New Delhi: 
Viking, 1988), 273–274. 
18 Young India, 29 May 1930, quoted in Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Walked 
Forward until Struck Down,’” 281. 
19 Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi, 130. 
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From the beginning I had strongly disliked the necessity of dispersing these non-
violent crowds and although the injuries inflicted on the law-breakers were almost 
invariably very slight the idea of using force against such men was very different 
from the more cogent need for using it against violent rioters who were 
endangering other men’s lives. At the same time I realized that the law-breakers 
could not be allowed to continue their deliberate misbehavior without any action 
by the police.20  
 
Curry’s response suggests the power of nonviolent action to create a dilemma among 
officials charged with responding to it. 
 
Responses to questions about dilemma actions  
The players were the independence movement, led by Gandhi, and the British raj, led by 
the viceroy, Lord Irwin. Note that particularly significant individual players—Gandhi 
and Irwin—stand out from, while being part of, the compound players. Gandhi initiated 
the engagement. 
 Available arenas included private interactions, courts, media and public spaces. 
The activists chose to play on the arena of public space, amplified by word-of-mouth 
and media coverage. However, Gandhi began by writing to Irwin—ostensibly a private 
interaction—to allow him to respond appropriately and avoid civil disobedience. 
 Types of dilemmas involved included moral (for example, for the policeman 
Curry), interpersonal (Gandhi corresponding with Irwin), inter-organizational (the salt 
march organizers versus the British rulers), political (challenge to British rule) and 
economic (challenge to the salt monopoly).  
 The opponent’s choices included letting the march proceed and arresting 
Gandhi. In the longer term, another choice was offering negotiations or concessions. 
 The consequences of the salt march included arrests and beatings (in the short 
term) and massive mobilization of support for Indian independence (both short and long 
term). 
 How did the salt march dilemma action differ from other possible actions? One 
feature that made it powerful was the choice to focus on the salt tax and salt monopoly. 
In objective terms, this was hardly the more serious issue experienced by the Indian 
people, given massive economic exploitation, lack of self-determination and 
                                                
20 Ibid., 133. 
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occasionally brutal treatment. In the spectrum of oppression, the salt laws were a minor 
matter—but they symbolized British rule and affected nearly everyone. 
 Second, the salt march was designed to begin small and gradually build. This 
meant there was no single point along the way to provide a pretext for arrests or 
controls. To follow his own laws, the Viceroy had to wait for civil disobedience to 
occur, at the end of the march. 
 Third, Gandhi’s central role in the march heightened the dilemma. If some other 
figure, with less stature, had led the march, it would not have attracted the same 
attention throughout India. Irwin could have ignored the march without Gandhi, treating 
it as unthreatening, or arrested the leader at an early stage without the opprobrium of 
arresting Gandhi. 
 
NORWEGIAN TOTAL OBJECTORS 
 
In the early 1980s, conscientious objectors created a number of dilemmas for the 
Norwegian government. All were what Jasper calls single players, namely individuals 
who refused conscription based on strong objections against participating in war, 
individually confronting an apparently almighty compound player.  
 Most conscientious objectors fitted into the system of the time—they had no 
trouble explaining their strong pacifist convictions, their objection to participating in 
any wars and their willingness to undertake substitute civil service. Some men became 
“situation-dependent objectors” because they did not want to fight in wars under the 
present system, frequently referring to Norway’s membership in NATO and the threat 
of nuclear war. Other men were “principled total objectors” who also refused civil 
service, stating that the substitute service was part of the military system and it was 
against their conscience to support any part of this system. Both types of objectors 
presented a dilemma for the Norwegian state. 
 For refusing to obey orders, the situation-dependent objectors were usually 
convicted twice to three-month prison sentences. During social democratic governments 
they were usually pardoned the second time, but not during conservative governments. 
The situation for the total objectors was even harsher: 16 months in prison, a treatment 
unlike anywhere else in Europe. Officially, it was not considered punishment: the total 
objectors had to carry out their substitute service in an “institution under the 
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administration of the prison Administration.” This contradiction—that what appeared to 
be a punishment was called something else—became the core of the total objectors’ 
spectacular protests, revolving around their court hearings and prison time and 
generating newspaper headlines like “Prison is not punishment.” Even their court 
hearings were not real court cases, because their only purpose was to establish their 
identity. They were not charged with anything criminal, and their service in prison was 
not entered into the criminal record. Nevertheless, media frequently reported as if this 
was a serious criminal offence, giving total objectors a right to compensation and 
showing that the Norwegian state had a difficult time explaining its practice.  
 During the early 1980s the plight of total objectors and situation-dependent 
objectors became widely known, largely due to their own efforts to place it on the 
political agenda. Their visibility also stimulated more men to object. Many objectors 
and their supporters had experience in other political movements for peace, justice and 
the environment. The objectors’ main compound player was Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt 
(KMV), which means “Campaign Against Conscription.” It was a network of total 
resisters launched in November 1981 and part of an international campaign for total 
objection originating in 1974.21  
 Between 1981 and 1989, KMV undertook many spectacular actions. To better 
accommodate the situation-dependent objectors, it was sometimes done in the name of 
an even more informal network called “Samvittighetsfanger i Norge” (S.I.N), “Prisoners 
of Conscience in Norway.” One of the objectors, Jørgen Johansen, produced a poster in 
connection with his court hearing in 1982 where he would be given 16 months in 
prison. He invited the public to come and watch this “drama in several acts arranged by 
the court and KMV.”22 In 1984, another young man set fire to his conscription book 
during his court hearing and said,  
 
This is not a court case. I will be told that I’m going to prison for 16 months, but 
I could have received that in a letter. Instead they dress this in a legal frame. The 
                                                
21 ICR Skandinavia, Verneplikt: Statlig Tvangsarbeid: Et Hefte Fra ICR-
Skandinavia [Conscription: State Forced Labour: A Booklet from ICR-Scandinavia], 
(Bergin: Fmks Fredspolitiske Skriftserie, 1981), 4. 
22 HA, “Totalnekter [Total Objector],” Halden Arbeiderblad (April 21, 1982). 
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only thing the judge is to do is to establish that I’m Harald Eraker and that I 
refuse substitute service.23  
 
When another young man was about to receive his 16-month sentence, Johansen 
“borrowed” a prosecutor robe and pretended to be the prosecutor in the case: the real 
prosecutor seldom bothered to show up in these cases where the result was foregone.24 
Johansen also applied to have his case tried before the European Commission of Human 
Rights in Strasburg, and a hearing was held in October 1985.25 Although the 
commission decided that “Johansen vs. Norway” was inadmissible, it was only the 
second case against the Norwegian state to even be considered for admission and with 
all likelihood was an embarrassment for the Norwegian state.  
 On three occasions, KMV and S.I.N created dilemma actions by staging a “jail-
in”: they jumped the fence and into the prison or sat on the prison wall, demanding to be 
with their imprisoned friend. The first jail-in took place on midsummer night in June 
1983, when situation-dependent objector Johan Råum was in prison. 12 people 
managed to climb up on the prison wall of Oslo Kretsfengsel with ladders, and 10 of 
them then jumped into the prison yard. Their demand was that either Johan Råum 
should be let out of prison, or they should all be locked up together with him since they 
had the same beliefs.26 Similar jail-ins were organized in 1984 and 1987.27 On the day 
of the jail-in, the prison authorities and then the police faced the dilemma of how to deal 
with the protestors on the spot, in particular whether to carry them away or let them stay 
in the prison as they demanded. The prisoners were allowed to hold a press conference 
together with their friend, and when they left the prison they were arrested and carried 
away by the police.28  
                                                
23 Kirsten Offerdal, “Brann Vernepliktsboka Si I Rettssalen [Burned His 
Conscription Book in Court],” Vårt Land (May 11, 1984). 
24 Jørgen Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force, or How to Open the Eyes of 
Ordinary People in Social Democratic Countries,” Philosophy and Social Action, Vol. 
17, No. 3–4 (1991): 23–29. 
25 Kjell Eriksson, “Klagen Avvist I Strassbourg [The Complaint Dismissed in 
Strasbourg],” Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad, October 15 1985. 
26 Gunnar Fortun, “Rømning—Feil Vei,” Arbeiderbladet (June 24, 1983); 
Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force.” 
27 Aftenposten, “Aksjon På Fengselsmurer,” Aftenposten (May 4, 1987); Stig 
Grimelid, “Ex-Fange Tilbake,” VG (August 28, 1984); Esther Nordland, “Inntok 
Fengselsmurene,” Arbeiderbladet (August 28, 1984).  
28 Johansen, “Humor as a Political Force.” 
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 Afterwards, a new dilemma arose for the prison authorities and prosecutor: 
charge them for trespassing or pretend that nothing happened? In spite of a written 
confession, the case was “dismissed for lack of evidence”—the same thing that 
happened in the prosecutor case.29 KMV interpreted this to mean that the authorities did 
not want any further publicity about the incident. Nevertheless, the long term dilemma 
remained for the politicians: should the law regarding total resisters be changed or 
should they hold their ground? KMV could be expected to carry out every imaginable 
action, had shown ability in inventing new ideas, and kept growing. Although still a tiny 
proportion of all conscripts, there were more total resisters than ever thanks to their 
organizing and the publicity they received. Total resistance was on the agenda as never 
before, being discussed in parliament and debated in major newspapers, with journalists 
questioning parliamentarians about the issue.30 The Norwegian state had to defend its 
practice in front of the commission to decide on “Johansen vs. Norway,” an issue it took 
so seriously that no total objectors were imprisoned while the case was pending. 
Amnesty International debated whether it should adopt them as prisoners of conscience. 
Towards the end of the 1980s the law was in fact changed; KMV felt certain that it had 
had a huge influence.  
 The KMV’s dramatic and provocative actions were effective in gaining attention 
and attracting support. In comparison, traditional forms of protest such as rallies and 
letter-writing campaigns, which are common in liberal democracies, would have been 
very unlikely to have had the same effect, since the total objectors were so few. Without 
the spectacular action to create attention, hardly anyone would have heard about their 
fate. Had there been large numbers of total resisters, the burden on the court and prison 
systems might have pressured the government to change the law. But although the 
number of total resisters grew, they remained a tiny proportion of the conscientious 
objectors and were never likely to become a substantial part of the prison population.  
 KMV’s actions were clearly focused on the legal system, which from their 
perspective appears to be an obvious choice. By choosing prisons and courts as arenas 
for their action they were proactive, because these institutions are traditionally 
dominated by the authorities. Many other arenas traditionally used for protest were also 
available, but using them would have been less spectacular. If KMV had been interested 
                                                
29 Ibid.; Åsne Berre Persen and Jørgen Johansen, Den Nødvendige Ulydigheten 
[The Necessary Civil Disobedience] ([Oslo]: Fmk, 1998). 
30 KMV, “Rundbrev 9,” Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt (November 1984). 
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in the arena of words rather than actions, they could have put more focus on the irony of 
their prison time being a “service to society,” but they did not go down this path in their 
actions. The authorities actually admitted that the reason for the 16-month prison 
“service” was to uphold respect for military service and convince most citizens to 
comply with the military and civil service.  
 
Responses to questions about dilemma actions  
The players were individual objectors, KMV and the Norwegian government. KMV 
initiated the engagements. 
 Available arenas included courts, prisons, media and public arenas. The activists 
chose to play in the courts and prisons as a way to generate media coverage.  
 The main type of dilemma involved was political (challenge to Norwegian 
government policy). The opponent’s choices included ignoring the protesters or legally 
charging them. In the longer term, another choice was changing the conscription law. 
 The consequences of the KMV actions included publicity for total resistance and 
situation-dependent objection (in the short term) and changing the law (long term). 
 How did the KMV dilemma actions differ from other possible actions? By using 
spectacular strategies, the protesters generated more publicity than conventional sorts of 
protest and complaint, and more sharply highlighted the contradictions in the 
government’s rationale for its policy. 
 
FREEDOM FLOTILLA TO GAZA 
 
In 2010, a convoy of six ships set out to challenge the blockade of the Gaza strip, 
posing a dilemma for the Israeli authorities imposing the blockade. On board the ships 
were around 700 unarmed civilians from around the world, including some well known 
personalities, like the Swedish crime novelist Henning Mankell and parliamentarians 
from a number of countries. In addition to the passengers and representatives from the 
media, the ships also carried 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, such as building materials 
and medical equipment like X-ray machines and ultrasound scanners.31 The long 
                                                
31 Moustafa edt Bayoumi, Midnight on the Mavi Marmara: The Attack on the 
Gaza Freedom Flotilla and How It Changed the Course of the Israel/Palestine Conflict 
(New York: OR Books, 2010). 
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journey meant that the pressure built while the ships approached Gaza, making this a 
drama for the world to watch.  
 In this case, there were two major compound players, the state of Israel and the 
freedom flotilla, each with its own internal struggles about how to handle the situation. 
However, this case also involved many other players and illustrates how other players 
can have key roles in a dilemma without being either the initiator of the engagement or 
the target.  
 The dilemma the activists created for the representatives of Israel at first sight 
has two “solutions”: either let the ships arrive in Gaza with their passengers and cargo, 
which in the eyes of many Israeli citizens would mean giving in to pressure. The other 
option was to stop the vessels, and in that case the next dilemma arose: what means 
should be used, and when? In the end, commando soldiers from the Israeli Defense 
Force attacked early in the morning on 31 May, while the ships were still in 
international waters. On board the Mavi Marmara, nine Turkish citizens were killed, 
some of them shot dead at close range.32 The killings created an enormous public 
relations disaster for the Israeli government, and were condemned around the world. 
Martin has shown how the use of force backfired on the Israeli government despite its 
efforts to inhibit public outrage.33 Many governments summoned the Israeli 
ambassadors or recalled their own.34 The relationship with the Turkish government, for 
decades one of the Israeli government’s few allies in the Middle East, was damaged for 
more than a year. Although the Obama administration in the United States was very 
restrained in its reactions, it expressed criticism of the Israeli government. A UN 
commission was established to investigate the attacks, and in August 2011 reached the 
controversial conclusion that the blockade of Gaza was not illegal, but that the use of 
force had been excessive and unreasonable.35  
 Stellan Vinthagen, a nonviolent scholar and himself active in the Swedish part 
of the freedom flotilla, has analyzed the 2010 flotilla as a dilemma action, using 
                                                
32 Paul McGeough, “Prayers, Tear Gas and Terror,” Sydney Morning Herald 
(June 4, 2010). 
33 Brian Martin, “Flotilla Tactics: How an Israeli Attack Backfired,” Truth-
out.org (July 27, 2010). 
34 Bayoumi, Midnight on the Mavi Marmara. 
35 BBC, “Gaza Ship Raid Excessive but Blockade Legal, Says UN,” BBC News 
(September 2, 2011); Geoffrey Palmer et al., Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (United Nations, 2011). 
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Lakey’s definition.36 Vinthagen shows what makes this a dilemma action in contrast to 
previous actions. On New Year’s Eve 2009, 1300 activists from 43 different countries 
tried to break the blockade by marching into Gaza. This initiative was just as 
international as the flotilla, but only carried symbolic amounts of humanitarian aid. It 
was stopped by Israeli authorities. Unlike Vinthagen, we consider this a dilemma 
action; it was just not as successful as the 2010 flotilla. Since 2008, the Free Gaza 
Movement had sent several passenger boats to Gaza, some of which arrived 
successfully. However, they could only carry a small amount of humanitarian aid. Viva 
Palestina was an initiative that tried to break the blockade by land on three occasions 
during 2009. However, Vinthagen found that they could not break the blockade since 
they relied on cooperation with Egyptian authorities, which at that time meant being 
dependent on the Israeli and US governments.  
 Vinthagen concluded that two aspects of the 2010 flotilla combined to make this 
a more powerful dilemma action: (1) it was ordinary humanitarian assistance, not just 
symbolic amounts, and (2) the delivery by ship meant that the activists were not 
depending on the Israeli authorities in order to break the blockade. He writes: “A ship is 
not “on its way” to do an action. The departure itself marks the beginning of the action: 
the challenge of the blockade. The action had already been going on for several days 
before Israel had a realistic chance of stopping it.”37 By making the sea the arena 
instead of the land, Vinthagen thinks the flotilla gained much more control.  
 Within the freedom flotilla movement there has been discussion about how to 
make the dilemma even more difficult. The following year, 2011, the campaign planned 
to repeat the journey, and 12 ships were ready to travel towards Gaza, 10 of them from 
Greek waters.38 More ships with passengers from even more countries were chosen as a 
means for raising the pressure.  
 However, the Israeli government avoided a repeat of the 2010 scenario by using 
more subtle ways of stopping the ships. They cultivated relationships with the Greek 
government, and launched a successful diplomatic offensive which resulted in UN 
General Secretary Ban Ki-moon calling on all governments to urge their citizens not to 
                                                
36 Stellan Vinthagen, “En Ny Sorts Dilemma-Aktion [A New Kind of Dilemma 
Action],” in Ship to Gaza: Bakgrunden, Resan, Framtiden [Ship to Gaza: The 
Background, the Journey, the Future], ed. Mikael Löfgren (Stockholm: Leopard, 2010). 
37 Ibid., 186. 
38 Jack Shenker and Conal Urquhart, “Activists’ Plan to Break Gaza Blockade 
with Aid Flotilla Is Sunk,” The Guardian (July 5, 2011). 
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participate in a second flotilla.39 The Greek authorities banned the ships from leaving 
their ports; those that attempted to leave anyway were intercepted by the Greek coast 
guard.40 Two of the ships had similar propeller damage, leading to suspicion that they 
had been sabotaged by the Israeli secret service.41 The Turkish authorities also 
prevented the Mavi Mamara from leaving Turkey—in spite of the Turkish 
government’s criticism of the blockade of Gaza. Only one ship, leaving from France, 
was boarded by Israeli commando soldiers.42 These events prevented a potential public 
relations disaster for the Israeli government. The Israeli authorities, by proactive 
lobbying, dealt with the potential dilemma before it landed on their doorstep. They 
managed to keep the issue in the arena of permissions to leave ports, thus preventing the 
activists from reaching their preferred arena, international waters. Bureaucratic 
obstacles are less newsworthy than a military attack in international waters.  
 The 2011 attempt to break the blockade is a classic example of how difficult it is 
to foresee what an opponent facing a dilemma will do when actions and reactions are 
not routine. The activists had prepared for many different Israeli government reactions, 
but not foreseen the possibility of bureaucratic obstacles of this kind. One way to 
surmount such obstacles would have been for the ships to start from different ports in 
different countries. However, this would have increased the organizational challenge of 
arriving in Gaza at the same time. It could have been a way of establishing the dilemma 
over a longer period of time, thereby increasing the pressure; however, it might have 
been easier to stop them separately using force, without the media drama of the first 
journey.  
 
Responses to questions about dilemma actions  
The players were the freedom flotilla and the Israeli government. The flotilla organizers 
initiated the engagements. 
 Available arenas included the sea, ships, borders and the media. The activists 
aimed to use ships in international waters as the basis for media coverage.  
                                                
39 Ann Wright, “The Israelis Mount a Diplomatic Offensive to Stop the Gaza 
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 The main types of dilemma involved were political (challenge to Israeli 
government policy) and economic (challenge to the blockade of Gaza). The opponent’s 
immediate choices included allowing the ships to deliver their goods and stopping them 
forcibly. In the longer term, other choices were easing the blockade and preventing the 
ships from leaving port. 
 The consequences of the flotilla actions included publicity for the cause of Gaza, 
publicity about Israeli government’s use of force (in the short term) and reducing 
international support for Israeli policy on Gaza (longer term). 
 How did the flotilla dilemma actions differ from other possible actions? Most 
Israeli use of force, on behalf of its policies on Palestine, is against Palestinians and 
hidden from international audiences. The flotilla put an international spotlight on Israeli 




Based on our examination of three dilemma actions, plus other instances,43 the essential 
feature of such an action is that the opponent has no obvious best response, with the 
most attractive responses having mixes of advantages and disadvantages that are not 
directly comparable. In addition we have been able to identify five factors frequently 
found in actual dilemma actions that add to the difficulty for opponents in making 
choices: (1) the action has a constructive, positive element; (2) activists use surprise or 
unpredictability; and (3) opponents’ prime choices are in different domains. Dilemma 
actions can also construct a timing that (4) appeals to mass media coverage, making it 
difficult for authorities to ignore them. Additionally, as Popovic, Milovojevic & 
Djinovic suggest, (5) appealing to widely held beliefs can increase the pressure.44 These 
factors contribute to making the dilemma more difficult to “solve,” but are not essential 
in constructing it. In both the literature and in the cases we have presented here, it is 
governments and their agents, such as police and prison officials, that are forced to deal 
with dilemmas. However, this is not a core feature of a dilemma action, since it can be 
directed towards private companies, for example banks or other financial institutions.  
                                                
43 Duhamel, Dilemma Demonstration; Lakey, Powerful Peacemaking; Popovic 
et al., Nonviolent Struggle; Sharp, Politics of Nonviolent Action. 
44 Popovic et al., Nonviolent Struggle. 
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When we began this study of dilemma actions, we suspected that some of the 
five factors that can contribute to creating the dilemma would be a necessary part of a 
dilemma action. Looking at the case studies revealed that they were not. The flotillas 
had constructive, positive elements but the total resistance campaign did not. The total 
resistance movement used surprise, but the salt march did not. In the salt march, the 
opponent’s prime choices were in different domains (including moral, interpersonal and 
political) but in the total resistance campaign they were in the same domain (political). 
All three case studies involved mass media coverage, but media coverage was less 
crucial to the salt march dilemma action. The flotillas appealed to widely held beliefs, 
but the total resistance campaign did not. The three case studies thus illustrate that the 
five factors can contribute to the acuteness of dilemma actions but are not essential 
components of them. Activists, when constructing dilemma actions, can consider 
whether the factors could be useful. Future research might expand this list of additional 
factors.  
 Usually the best option for the opponents is to stop the action without anybody 
noticing. The activists’ strategy is then to make it as public as possible. In the freedom 
flotilla, organizers increased attention by involving people from different countries, 
including journalists, authors and parliamentarians. The Norwegian total resisters did 
things so unexpected and newsworthy that the prison authorities felt they could not 
ignore them.  
Many nonviolent actions are reactions to what authorities or multinational 
companies do: activists respond to agendas set by others. In dilemma actions, activists 
are proactive, which is one reason why dilemma actions interest activists both 
theoretically and practically. Although the colonization of India, conscription in 
Norway, and the blockade of Gaza were the initial starting points for the engagements 
in the case studies, activists initiated the salt march, the jail-in and the freedom flotilla. 
They chose the arenas and the timing, forcing authorities to make difficult choices. This 
also means that for the opponent, preparation becomes more difficult: rather than 
preparing for a single contingency, for example arresting protesters, authorities might 
need to prepare for handling fallout from not arresting protesters, if that is the response 
chosen. 
 Prior to 1930, salt was just one issue among many in India; it was a routine facet 
of imperial rule. The salt march created a new agenda, with the arena and timing set by 
independence campaigners.  
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 Prior to the 1980s, the Norwegian state dealt with total resisters on an individual 
basis: each individual made the choice in his own home. KMV moved the struggle to 
public arenas such as courts and prison walls. By the mid 1980s it appeared that the 
Norwegian total resisters were directing the show, forcing Norwegian authorities to 
react.  
 On land, the Israeli government controlled access to Gaza. The freedom flotilla 
organizers made a conscious choice to make the sea their arena. They could decide 
when to set out. However, by 2011 they had lost the element of surprise and were 
unable to foresee the Israeli government’s method of responding.  
 In all three cases, activists framed what they did as something positive and 
valued. They made salt, went to be with their friend in prison, and delivered 
humanitarian aid. It became a contest over what was really going on—a framing 
contest. Authorities could choose to interpret the actions in the same ways as the 
activists. Alternatively, if they chose not to accept this positive and constructive 
framing, and insisted on treating the activists as provocateurs and law breakers, they 
faced the challenge of explaining what was wrong with making salt, supporting a friend 
who is in prison but not being punished, and sending emergency aid to a disaster area. 
Popovic, Milovojevic & Djinovic suggested that forcing an authority to go against a 
widely held belief or give in to activist demands is the essential part of a dilemma 
action;45 here we find examples of how the emphasis on widely held positive values 
helps make the dilemma more difficult. However, we do not consider this an essential 
feature of a dilemma action.  
 Regarding the freedom flotilla, Vinthagen (2010) suggests that two key aspects 
were that by choosing the sea the activists were much more in control and that the 
amount of humanitarian aid was more than symbolic. These accord respectively with an 
essential characteristic of dilemma actions, initiating the engagement, and a frequent 
one, a constructive element. However, the two other cases do not include any equivalent 
to humanitarian aid: in the case of the Norwegian total resisters, the constructive 
element of supporting a friend does not appear to be essential for that action. It is 
possible to imagine other powerful dilemma actions that do not include any such 
element.  




 Creating a dilemma for opponents is, naturally enough, a key feature of dilemma 
actions. Dilemmas can be more difficult when they involve different domains, for 
example when one choice has ideological consequences and another has political 
consequences, because these consequences are not readily compared. 
 Regarding the salt march, Lord Irwin had a choice between arresting someone 
who had not done anything illegal—which included a moral component—and allowing 
the march to proceed, with a political impact on Indian and international public opinion. 
 One thing to take into consideration is different audiences. It is frequently 
difficult to compare the benefit of an approving reaction from supporters with negative 
feedback from a different audience. Israeli authorities had to compare their image of 
themselves as upholding a blockade meant to protect Israel with the outrage generated 
when international audiences saw this as an assault on humanitarian aid workers in 
international waters. A special audience is the mass media, which are often crucial in 
spreading the news of the action to other audiences.  
Unpredictability was also a factor hindering the process of comparing choices. 
Neither the Israelis nor the freedom flotilla could readily predict or control how the 
Turkish government or people would react and what consequences their reaction would 
have in the long run.  
 Timing is another aspect of dilemma actions highlighted by the case studies. A 
challenging dilemma not only means that the players have to make choices between 
incomparable realms, but also that there are short, middle and long term consequences 
to take into consideration. What seems to be a good solution in the short run might 
backfire in the long run. Additionally we notice that in both the salt march and the 
freedom flotilla there was a long build up before the climax of the direct confrontation. 
Everyone involved, including mass media, is aware that something dramatic is going to 
happen.  
 All of these characteristics can also be found in other nonviolent actions, which 
is why we do not want to draw a sharp line between what is a dilemma action and what 
is not. Earlier we mentioned that ploughshare actions involving damage to weapons are 
not dilemma actions. Looking at the characteristics we have identified we see that the 
ploughshare actions often involve surprise regarding when and where. But it is not 
difficult for the authorities to compare the consequences of arresting versus not 
arresting the activists, so the essential feature is lacking. However, creating dilemmas 
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for the opponent is not necessary for nonviolent actions to be successful in the eyes of 
their organizers or bystanders. 
 Experience in responding to dilemma actions can change the opponent’s 
calculation: as opponents learn more about a particular type of action, they prepare, so 
the dilemma is different or not present; therefore activists need to change their plans and 
preparation to ensure that there is a dilemma. The freedom flotilla experience from 2011 
reveals how Israeli authorities learned how to defuse a potential repetition of the 2010 
experience; this provides additional evidence that the 2010 events backfired on the 
Israeli government. 
  So far, we have discussed nonviolent dilemma actions targeted at governments, 
but dilemma actions are not automatically for a just cause. It is also possible for 
governments and others with power to undertake dilemma actions, aiming to split 
movements, defuse protests, mislead public opinion, and discredit protesters. Most 
commonly these involve violence or the threat of violence.  
 During the Nazi occupation of Denmark 1940–1945, the occupiers created 
dilemmas for the resistance movement. When the resistance movement carried out 
liquidation of informers or acts of sabotage, the Nazis in revenge organized so-called 
clearing murders: extrajudicial killings of members or suspected members of the 
resistance, prominent Danes or randomly chosen civilians. The first to be killed this way 
was the well-known priest and poet Kaj Munk. Another form of “counter-sabotage” was 
blowing up well-respected businesses or buildings, such as the amusement park Tivoli’s 
concert hall. The situation was not presented as a dilemma officially, since in contrast to 
other places in occupied Europe, the Nazis in Denmark never admitted being behind the 
counter-sabotage. Nevertheless, within the resistance movement and the general public, 
there was no doubt about the dilemma involved: the resistance movement had to 
compare the effect of sabotage and informer liquidation to the loss of people like Kaj 
Munk, and the possibility of loss of support from the general population.46  
  A comparable dilemma arose for the members of the organization Peace 
Brigades International (PBI) in Sri Lanka in 1993. They had been carrying out unarmed 
accompaniment as protection to local human rights activists threatened by the Sri 
Lankan government. Both they and those they accompanied felt that their presence 
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provided some protection and made a difference. They also tried to support a group of 
Tamil refugees living in Colombo about to be relocated by the government to the war-
torn Northeast Province against their will and managed to prevent the first group of 
refugees from being forcefully relocated. But then the Sri Lankan authorities created a 
dilemma for PBI. Via foreign embassies, they let it be known that if PBI insisted on 
involving itself in the refugee issue, the organization would lose its permission to work 
in the country. PBI was then faced with the dilemma of withdrawing from this 
particular case (which it did) in order to be able to continue other parts of its work.47  
 Finally, there are some rare instances in which authorities have used nonviolent 
methods against peaceful protesters. In 1930 during the Indian independence struggle:  
 
… a huge procession of Satyagrahis was stopped by armed police on one of 
Bombay’s main streets. About 30.000 men, women and children sat down 
wherever they were on the street. Facing them sat the police. Hours passed but 
neither party would give in. Soon it was night and it began to rain. The 
onlooking citizens organised themselves into volunteer units to supply the 
Satyagrahis with food, water and blankets. The Satyagrahis, instead of keeping 
the supplies for themselves, passed them on to the obstructing policemen as a 
token of their good will. Finally the police gave in, and the procession 
culminated in a triumphant midnight march.48  
 
For the Satyagrahis, stepping on the police to reach their goal was not a viable option, 
so instead they sat down and waited as well: there was no real dilemma for those 
committed to nonviolence. When the police were treated with respect and kindness, it 
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Dilemma actions are a type of action in which opponents have to make a choice 
between two or more responses, each of which has significant negative aspects; the 
responses are not readily comparable, which is the nub of the dilemma. Dilemma 
actions can be characterized by the players involved, the initiator of the engagement, the 
arena chosen for the action, the domain of the dilemma, the choices made and the 
location of the action within the “option space” of possible actions.  
 Dilemma actions are not easy to analyze in depth using game theory or other 
sorts of strategic frameworks, because usually compound players are involved, whose 
members differ in their judgments about the attractiveness of options. Furthermore, 
players can change the payoffs from different options by investigating new possibilities, 
making preparations or playing unexpected moves. As a result, the same game is 
seldom played repeatedly without change. The changes in the freedom flotilla scenarios 
between 2010 and 2011 are a case in point. 
 For activists, dilemma actions can seem attractive because they seem to offer the 
prospect of success no matter what the opponent does. In a typical dilemma action 
involving nonviolent action, the opponent can either let the activists proceed to achieve 
their immediate goals or use force to stop them with the risk of adverse publicity. 
However, on the surface there seems no obvious reason why dilemma actions are 
superior to actions in which the opponent has a single best option. 
 One way to see the advantage of planning dilemmas is illustrated in Figure 1. Of 
four main options, A through D, A is clearly superior for the opponent. Preparation by 
activists—for example, by arranging publicity so that the opponent’s use of force will 
be more counterproductive—changes the payoff for A so that it is similar to the payoff 
for D: the opponent’s previous best option is no longer clearly superior. Figure 1 
presents options as different in one dimension, with a clear-cut payoff for each that can 
be compared; in reality, options and payoffs may vary across several dimensions, 
including diverse domains, and payoffs may be uncertain and non-comparable. The 
creation of a dilemma action can be considered a process of designing an action in 
which the normal or default response by the opponent is made less attractive than it 
might otherwise be. Planning to put the opponent in a dilemma can be a way of 
stimulating thinking about how to reduce the attractiveness of the opponent’s regular or 




Figure 1 Opponent payoffs for four options, A through D. Following activist 
preparations to reduce the attractiveness of option A (dotted line), the opponent faces a 
dilemma in choosing between A and D. 
 
 Starting with the limited amount of writing about dilemma actions, we have 
extracted the essential characteristic of such actions, presented a range of domains in 
which dilemmas can be posed, and shown the value of a series of questions for 
analyzing actual dilemma actions. Much remains to be studied concerning dilemma 
actions. Investigating more case studies, including ones involving different domains, 
could enable assessment and refinement of our essential features and typical but non-
essential features. This should also include comparisons with cases of nonviolent action 
that do not include a dilemma. The use of dilemma actions by authorities against 
activists would also be a fruitful area for study in order to understand both nonviolent 
and violent dilemmas better. Yet another area worth investigation is the possibility of 
creative responses to dilemma actions, including counter-dilemmas.  
 More generally, the study of dilemma actions means looking at tactics on both 
sides of strategic encounters involving activists and authorities. Nonviolent action 
theory in the tradition of Sharp (1973) has focused on what activists do and seldom 
looks at a full range of actions by authorities. Examining dilemma actions thus provides 
a way of expanding nonviolent action theory. 
